The ordo iuris wove into the fabric of Western thought some basic legal principles and concepts that we now take for granted-although perhaps we shouldn't. Among the most important of these are idea of due process of law,* 4 the presumption of innocence,5 the privilege against self-incrimination,6 and the belief that in a just society everyone, rulers and their agents as well as their subjects, must obey the law or be held re sponsible should they fail to do so.7 My purpose here is to sketch briefly just some of the innovations in the law of evidence that became current during the thirteenth century. History 19(1975) 265-279. 5 Ecclus. 11.7; Codex Theodosianus, ed. Theodor Mommsen, 3 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1905 , repr. 1990 Cod 7.16; Hostiensis, Lectura to X 5.34.16 §3 (Venice: Apud Iuntas, 1581; repr. Turin: Bottega d 'Erasmo, 1965) A basic axiom of the ordo iuris held that no judge could lawfully pun ish a wrongdoer unless and until his guilt had been conclusively proved.8 The standard of proof that twelfth-century jurists required demanded a level of evidence that was extremely difficult to meet. Proof, they in sisted, must be clearer than the light of day.9 A criminal conviction, they maintained, must rest either on a free confession of guilt by the accused or else on sworn testimony from two credible eyewitnesses to the crime, or evidence in two authentic documents, or some combination of oral and written evidence.10
While this standard of proof protected defendants from being con victed on slender evidence, perhaps furnished by a malicious accuser, it also made it extraordinarily difficult to convict perpetrators of what ju rists described as occult crimes, that is, offenses that were unlikely to leave traces in formal documents and which offenders usually commit ted when no witness-much less two of them-were around.
Irregular sexual behavior by the clergy was one occult crime that thir teenth-century popes were especially eager to repress. Popes and coun cils during the previous century had made it legally impossible for cler ics in major orders-subdeacons, deacons, priests, and bishops-to marry and categorically forbade them to engage in sexual relations of any kind with anyone, or for that matter any thing.11 Despite this, clergy men, being human, now and again yielded to carnal temptations. Some See especially Fraher, "Ut nullus describatur reus." 9 Cod. 4. 19.25 and Accursius, Glos. ord Press, 1990; hereafter DEC) 1:191,194, 198; James A. Brundage, Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) 220, 314-319, 342-343. parishioners indeed demanded that their pastors take a concubine, in the hope that this would inhibit them from making lewd advances to the wives and daughters of members of their flock.12
Let us look at a not uncommon hypothetical situation: A parish priest keeps an unmarried woman to look after his domestic arrangements. She prepares his meals, does his housekeeping, and becomes his daily com panion. Let us suppose that in the course of time she bears a child whose features remarkably resemble those of the priest. Under these circum stances suspicion that their relationship was not above reproach was likely to arise. Suspicion based on circumstantial evidence, however, no matter how plausible, was not proof, yet proof was essential for convic tion and conviction in turn was required for punishment.13 Unless our hypothetical priest and housekeeper were rash enough to engage in sex ual relations in the view of two witnesses, they could not be punished for misconduct under the two-witness standard, provided that they were pre pared to deny the offense under oath.14 One leading authority declared that a judge could not even convict someone who committed a crime at high noon in the judge's presence, so long as the judge was not sitting in court at the time, the perpetrator denied the act, and no other witness came forward to testify against him.15 Similar problems arose, not surprisingly, with murder, heresy, simony, and usury, among other occult crimes. Both civil and ecclesiastical au thorities found this situation unsatisfactory. As Pope Innocent III (r. 1198-1216) terest that crimes not remain unpunished." 16 The challenge was to find some way to secure canonical condemnation without abandoning the two-witness rule, which was supported by so many scriptural passages and other venerable authorities that discarding it would have been ex tremely embarrassing.17
Teachers of Roman and canon law fretted about this problem for decades. The Decretum Gratiani, the fundamental textbook of canon law from the 1150's onward, did contain texts that could be read to suggest that a judge might properly find a defendant guilty of a crime on the tes timony of a single witness, provided that the testimony was corroborated by a general belief in his guilt among virtually everyone in the commu nity where the crime occurred.18 An anonymous commentator writing in the 1160's had elaborated further on this idea: A presumption, according to leading authorities, was "an argument giving rise to a belief in one fact based upon proof of another fact."20 Procedural writers around the beginning of the thirteenth century dis tinguished four species of presumption-rash, probable, violent, and necessary-and assigned different gradations of probative weight to each type.21 Thus, for example, if a witness discovered a man and a woman naked and alone in a private place, but did not actually see them having sexual relations, his testimony alone could not prove that they had done so. The circumstances, however, gave rise to a presumptionin this case a violent presumption-that they had either engaged in or in tended to engage in sexual activity. Under the strict rules of evidence, however, such a presumption, however strong, did not count. By the 1190's, however, opinions had begun to change and jurists were starting to characterize violent and necessary presumptions as half-proofs {pro-bationes semiplenae). This implied that if the testimony of one witness, which constituted half of a full proof, were put together with a presump tion that carried the weight of a half-proof the combination should add up to a full proof.22 Azo (d. after 1229/1230) spelled this out explicitly not long after 1200 in his Summa on Justinian's Code.23
In the context of these developments in juristic teaching Innocent III sought to make it easier to punish clerics who kept concubines. In answer 20 Tancred, Onto iudiciarius 3.14.2, ed. Bergmann, 258: "Praesumtio est argumentum ad credendum unum factum, surgens ex probatione alterius facti, puta, probatur coniacentia suspectarum personarum, praesumitur coitus intervenisse.. . . " See also Alessandro Giuliani, "II concetto classico di prova: La prova come 'argumentum, '" Jus 11 (1960) to a question from Bishop Martin of Osimo, who asked whether it would be proper to take steps against a cleric who, according to reports from "good men" of the region, lived publicly with a concubine, even if no ac cuser had come forward to bring a formal accusation against him, Inno cent replied in the decretal Tua nos on 11 May 1198:
If the crime is so public that it deserves to be called notorious, neither witness nor accuser is required since no cover-up [tergiversatio] could conceal a crime of this sort. If it is indeed pub lic, not through evidence, but rather through common knowl edge [fama] , in that case a report alone is not enough for their condemnation, since judgment results not from reports but from witnesses. If suspicion about these clerics arouses scandal among the people, however, they are to undergo canonical pur gation, even though no one appears to accuse them. If they do not wish to furnish it, or fail to do so successfully, you ought to pun ish them with a canonical reprimand.24
Thus in order to make it easier to charge and convict clergymen sus pected of sexual misbehavior, the pope was prepared to relax existing standards of criminal procedure and to permit a judge to commence a prosecution based upon notoriety. This stripped suspects of an important protection that the ordo iuris traditionally afforded them.25 Innocent re turned frequently to this problem and elaborated his procedural innova tions further in subsequent decisions. Those decisions, like this one, en tered the mainstream of canonical teaching through their incorporation in the decretal collections taught in the law schools.26 24 X 3.2.8 Tua nos (Potthast 698): "Nos igitur consultationi tuae taliter respondemus, quod, si crimen eorum ita publicum est, ut de merito debeat appellari notorium, in eo casu nec testis nec accusator est necessarius, quum huiusmodi crimen nulla possit tergiversatione celari. Si vero publicum est, non ex evidentia, sed ex fama: in eo casu ad condemnationem eorum sola testimonia non sufficiunt, quum non sit testimoniis, sed testibus iudicandum. Si de clericis ipsis tabs habeatur suspicio, ut ex ea scandalum generetur in populo, licet contra ipsos non apperuit accusator, eis tamen est canonica purgatio indicenda. Quam si prestare noluerint, vel deficierint in praestanda, eos canonica debebis animadversione punire." See also Levy, La hierarchie des preuves,\ 13.
25 This move did have some prior authority. In his comments on a passage ascribed to St. Ambrose, Gratian had remarked that parts of the ordo iuris could be dispensed with when dealing with "manifest" offenses, namely those that could not readily be concealed (nec tergiuersatione propria crimen celatur); Decretum Gratiani C. Notorium as a category of evidence was a novel creation that had no real counterpart in Roman law.27 It began to enter the vocabulary of canon lawyers through a passage in Gratian's Decretum that states that some crimes can be prosecuted without an accusation if "officials" de nounce someone for a criminal offense.28 Gratian's misunderstanding of a passage in Justinian's Code29 led commentators on Gratian's work to speak of a special category of notorious crimes for which procedural safeguards might be relaxed.30 Early writers on procedural law picked this up and developed it further.31 Law professors, however, had misgiv ings about this innovation and warned their students to be cautious about using it. Tancred (ca. 1185-1235 or 1236), the leading authority on judi cial procedure in the first half of the thirteenth century, approached the matter gingerly. Tancred declared that the rules of the ordo iudiciarius still applied even in proceedings based on notorium. No responsible judge could find someone guilty of a notorious crime unless two credible witnesses were prepared to swear that all or virtually all members of the 27 The emperor Gordian, in fact, expressly prohibited prosecutions based on noto rium; Cod. 9.2.7. Medieval canonists, however, sometimes cited a passage from St. Paul concerning a case of flagrant sexual immorality at Corinth to justify their doctrine; 1 Cor. 5:1-5. See also Levy, "Le probleme de la preuve," 160-161, as well as John A. Crook, "Was There a 'Doctrine of Manifest Guilt' in the Roman Criminal Law," Proceedings o f the Cambridge Philological Society 33 (1987) 38-52, and Rosalio Castillo Lara, "Los primeros desarrollos doctrinales del 'notorium' en la canonlstica clasica," Salesianum 22 (1960) 44-45,50, and 56 community believed that the defendant had committed the offense. The judge must summon the defendant to answer the charges against him and must allow him adequate opportunity to rebut them-a basic component of due process.32 Tancred further distinguished between notorium iuris, which meant a criminal conviction based on traditional proofs, and noto rium facti, which referred to a widespread public knowledge of a defen dant's guilt. He insisted that judges must be cautious in dealing with sit uations where a defendant's alleged guilt was based on notorium facti. They needed to make sure that people actually knew, not simply sus pected, that the defendant was guilty. Mere rumors based on speculation or suspicion that circulated among the defendant's neighbors were cer tainly not enough to warrant action.33
Later writers shared Tancred's reservations about notorium as proof. Cardinal Hostiensis (d. 1271) for one asserted that the testimony of an eyewitness plus common belief in the defendant's guilt and other cir cumstances were simply inadequate to justify finding a defendant guilty of a serious crime.34 He was not the only one to hold this view.35 It ap parently prevailed in practice at least in England, since by the end of the thirteenth century church courts there had virtually ceased to accept proof by notorium as conclusive.36
This does not mean, however, that notorium as a fixture in the law of proof was dead. Far from it. Notorium enjoyed a long, if not altogether admirable, career as one of the foundations for inquisitorial procedure. 34 Hostiensis, Lectura to X 2.20.10 §3 v. iudicasti, fol. 86va: "Sed contra quia hie erat unus testis idoneus, ergo per ipsum et famam cum aliis adminiculis satis potuit constare de crimine et sic debuit condemnari, quia fama consentiens probat.. . . Solutio: Non est verum, quia in crimine probationes apertissime requiruntur." Cf. his Lectura to X 3.2.8 § § 1, 3, and 9, fol. 7ra-va. Before proceeding further the author must stress that criminal procedure per inquisitionem was by no means limited to the inquisitio haeretice pravitatis, that is to say what is usually, but erroneously, called "The In quisition," with all the dreadful connotations of that term.37 Inquisitors who specialized in the pursuit of persons suspected of holding unortho dox views on religious doctrine, to be sure, did employ inquisitorial pro cedure. But other judges in both ecclesiastical and civil courts used the same procedure to inquire not only into suspected criminal activity, but also into disputes over transactions between private parties.38 Inquisito rial procedure originated as a method for investigating precisely the kind of situation that the author posited above in his hypothetical example concerning clerical incontinence.39 It then blossomed into a fundamen tal, all-purpose method for prosecuting crimes of every sort. Its effec tiveness in dealing with occult crimes, its efficiency in disposing of cases speedily, and its assumed value as a deterrent made it attractive to civil rulers as well as to church authorities.40
Accusatory procedure was hobbled not only by the need for two cred ible witnesses to prove an accusation, but also because it required an ac cuser to come forward to lay a charge, perhaps against a friend or neigh bor. Doing that was likely to make him enemies, possibly deadly ones; while at the same time it exposed the accuser to the potential danger that should he be unable to prove his charge he became liable to legal retri bution for bringing a false accusation.41 The other traditional means for dealing with ecclesiastical crimes, denunciation, was even less effective than accusatory procedure in dealing with perpetrators of occult crimes. Denunciation began with an informal warning to a wrongdoer (denunciatio evangelica), calling upon him to mend his ways, as recommended in the Gospels.42 Should the miscreant fail to do so, the person who had de livered the admonition then laid a formal denunciation of the offender's failure to reform before a judge (denunciatio iudicialis)-, and the judge summoned the defendant to answer the complaint. The trial itself fol lowed much the same procedure and employed the same strict standard of proof as a case brought by accusation.43 The person who made a de nunciation rather than an accusation, however, was not subject to the lex talionis if he failed to prove his case.44
Winfried Trusen showed nearly twenty years ago that Innocent III sought from the start of his pontificate for alternative ways to punish in fractions against canon law.45 4 6 Before the close of his second year in office he had hit on the basic outlines for a new approach to criminal procedure called inquisition On 2 December 1199 Innocent ruled in a case brought to him on appeal that "frequent outcries" and "public report" that some one had committed a criminal offence, entitled a judge to begin a judicial inquiry (inquisitio) to discover whether there was an adequate basis for holding the alleged offender guilty of the crime imputed to him.47 Thus KA74 (1988) 168-230. 46 X 5.3.31 = 3 Comp. 5.2.3; Potthast 888 (10 December 1199) : "Ad corrigendos igitur subditorum excessus tanto diligentius debet praelatus assurgere, quanto damnabilius eorum offensas desereret incorrectas. Contra quos, ut de notoriis excessibus taceatur, etsi tribus modis procedi possit, per accusationem videlicet, denunciationem et inquisitionem ipsorum." Innocent had used the term inquisitio to describe a judicial investigation even earlier, in a letter dated 23 September 1198; Trusen, "Der InquisitionsprozeB,"189-190. 47 X 5.3.31: "[N] os, ut praediximus, frequentibus clamoribus excitati, ex officio nos tro voluimus inquirere de praemissis, omnes omnino monachos, qui vel cum ipso, vel con tra ipsum abbatem accesserant, iuramenti adstringentes, ut de propositis plenam, quam scirent, exponerent veritatem." notorium, not only constituted a half-proof, but could also provide the basis for initiating a criminal trial per inquisitionem,48
Innocent's quest for a more efficient and effective system of criminal procedure initially found expression in a series of decretals.49 Like many of his other reform initiatives, Innocent incorporated this one into the constitutions of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. The pope, no doubt in consultation with a small group of advisers, prepared the council's constitutions in advance. The 404 cardinals, archbishops, and bishops, as well as numerous abbots, priors, cathedral canons, representatives of re ligious orders, and of European monarchs who assembled at the Lateran on 11 November 1215 were there to ratify those constitutions, not to de bate them, much less to amend them or to propose new ones. Discussions at the formal sessions of the council centered on a handful of the draft proposals that dealt with dogmatic issues. No evidence suggests that Qualiter et quando,50 the constitution that solemnly integrated the use of inquisitorial process into the formal legal structure of the western church, was debated at all.51
Although Qualiter et quando made it easier both to initiate criminal charges and to secure a conviction on them, it preserved the most basic elements of the ordo iuris. The defendant must be summoned to appear; he must be informed of the charges and given an opportunity to defend himself. The constitution specified that he must be told who had testified against him and what they had said. He must likewise be permitted to enter objections and rebut their evidence, "lest the suppression of the names of a hostile witness or the exclusion of exceptions present an in solent person with the chance to bear false witness."52 Professors of canon law were naturally eager to incorporate the canons of the council into their curriculum as soon as possible so that their stu dents would be up-to-date with the latest law when they began to prac tice in the courts. Qualiter et quando was especially important in this re gard because mastery of procedure was (and is) a bread-and-butter skill for practitioners.
Johannes Teutonicus (ca. 1170-1245), a leading law teacher in Bologna, quickly composed a set of glosses on the Lateran constitutions and also put together for teaching purposes a collection of Innocent Ill's decretals that included virtually all of the council's constitutions.53 Jo hannes' gloss apparatus on Qualiter et quando raised some interesting problems concerning methods of proof in per inquisitionem proceedings. Harking back to Innocent Ill's ruling in Tua nos referred to earlier, Jo hannes observed that if the evidence against a defendant amounted only to partial proof, then the defendant should have the opportunity to clear his name by canonical purgation. Purgation required the defendant to swear an oath denying the allegations made against him, supported by sworn statements from others attesting to his good name and credibility.54
Even more intriguing was Johannes' treatment of the question of whether a defendant in a proceeding that the judge himself initiated ex 52 "Debet igitur esse presens is contra quern facienda est inquisitio, nisi se per contu maciam absentauerit. Et exponenda sunt illi capitula de quibus fuerit inquirendum, ut facultatem habeat defendendi seipsum, et non solum dicta, set etiam ipsa nomina testium sunt ei, ut quid a quo sit dictum appareat, publicanda, necnon exceptiones et replicationes legitime admittende, ne per suppressionem nominum infamandi, per exceptionum uero exclusionem deponendi falsum audacia prebeatur." 53 The collection came to be known as Compilatio quarta and became part of the stan dard curriculum in the schools of canon law until it became obsolete with the publication of the Decretales Gregorii IX (or Liber Extra) officio should have the chance to produce witnesses to prove his inno cence. If an opponent produced witnesses against him, Johannes said, then the defendant would certainly have the right to bring forward wit nesses to rebut them. If a judge acting ex officio produced witnesses, however, the defendant had no right of rebuttal since the judge was pre sumed not to be his adversary. But, Johannes continued, what if the pope commenced an inquisitorial proceeding against someone on the basis of public reports and the defendant wished to prove that on the contrary he was of good repute? In that case, Johannes asserted, the relevant issue was not a crime but ill-fame. If the defendant could show that he was generally considered to be a reputable member of the community, he should have the chance to do so; and if he succeeded the judge must drop the action.55
Let me raise one final point by way of conclusion. The speculations of medieval popes and lawyers about the evidential value that courts should assign to the kinds of partial proof that we have been discussing had long-term consequences of a kind that none of those involved could have foreseen. When Pascal (1623-1662) in the seventeenth century and Leibnitz ( 1640-1716) a generation later began to come to grips with the philosophical and moral problems involved in estimating the degree of likelihood that a particular action now would produce a predictable result in the future, they turned to legal terms and concepts that originated in medieval theories of proof. They likewise drew upon ideas that medieval lawyers developed to deal with the consequences of aleatory contracts. These were agreements concerning such matters as the likelihood of an insured cargo being lost at sea, the life expectancy of the beneficiary of an annuity, and other transactions whose outcomes depended on vari ables that could not be predicted with certainty. As a result many ele ments of modern probability theory rest in part upon foundations laid by medieval lawyers concerned with problems in the law of proof.56 
